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Introduction 
 
Since the beginning of the 1990s Bulgaria has experienced several episodes of banking 
sector crises in: 1991-1994, 1995 and 1996-1997 (Table1.). We focus on the deepest and 
most complex one, which took place in 1996-1997 and affected about one third of the 
banking sector. The 1996-1997 banking sector crisis coincided with a currency crisis, 
which reinforced the banking sector crisis. Macroeconomic vulnerabilities combined with 
delayed structural reforms in the banking and enterprise sectors and contributed to the 
development of a dual banking and currency crisis.  
 
The main objective of the paper is to identify the initial conditions and vulnerabilities that 
led to the 1996-1997 crisis, as well as to outline the key developments and characteristics 
of the dual banking and currency crisis. In addition, it analyzes the crisis resolution 
policies implemented by the authorities.  
 
The first section focuses on the structural and macroeconomic weaknesses that brought 
about the dual crisis. The second section addresses the crisis period with a special 
emphasis placed on the second wave of the crisis that took place in the second half of 
1996. The section addresses the main developments and characteristics of the banking 
and currency crisis, as well as the authorities’ policy response.  The third section explains 
the specifics of the monetary policy conducted during the critical second wave of the 
crisis, and the last section covers the authorities’ major restructuring effort that took place 
in the second half of 1997 with the currency board introduction. 
 
 
                                                 
*  Dr. Lena Roussenova, Sofia University of National and World Economy, Department of Finance and 
European Institute, Ex-Board Member of the Bulgarian National Bank. 
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Table 1. Bulgaria: Episodes of Banking Sector Crises in the 1990s 
Period Magnitude of the Banking Crisis  Crisis Features 
1991-
1994 
Former state-owned banks inherited from centrally planned 
economy non-performing loans amounting to more than 50 
percent of total loans.  In 1993-1994   banks’ inherited bad loans 
were replaced with ZUNK bonds. 
 
Banks faced solvency 
problems.   
1995 Two state-owned banks faced liquidity problems. Liquidity problems emerged. 
1996 --
H1-1997 
The crisis affected about one third of the banking sector - both 
state-owned and private banks, and was characterized by several 
sub-periods: 
• In spring 1996 the BNB Board placed five banks into 
conservatorship.  
• In September 1996 the BNB Board placed another nine 
banks into conservatorship. 
• In April 1997 the BNB Board placed one more bank into 
conservatorship.  
Widespread banking crisis 
combined with a severe 
currency crisis. Solvency 
and liquidity problems 
persisted. 
 
 
1. Initial Structural and Macroeconomic Conditions 
 
A review of the initial financial sector and macroeconomic vulnerabilities allows the 
identification of the risks, some of which developed into major causes and driving forces 
behind the banking and currency crisis. We view vulnerabilities as risk factors that 
increase the economy sensitivity to shocks. Some of these factors coincided and mutually 
reinforced each other, while others grew in strength independently and caused severe 
disturbances that finally resulted in a banking sector and currency crisis. 
 
1.1. Banking Sector Vulnerabilities 
 
At the beginning of Bulgaria’s transition a two-tier banking system emerged, consisting 
of a central bank and numerous highly concentrated and relatively specialized commercial 
banks. A Bank Consolidation Company  (BCC) was set up in 1992, which served as a 
holding company for the shares of the state-owned banks. It was expected to merge the 
existing state-owned banks and prepare them for privatization. By 1996 the mergers of 
state-owned banks reduced their number to ten, including the State Savings Bank (SSB). 
The number of private banks exceeded 30, while the number of foreign banks and 
branches was only five.  The state-owned banks held about 2/3 of the banking sector 
assets. The sector was highly concentrated, as the five largest banks held 60% of total 
assets. Most state-owned banks remained sectorally and regionally oriented. 
 
Some of the major banking sector vulnerabilities stemmed from the loose licensing and   
exit standards and procedures.  In the early 1990s many small private banks began to 
emerge thanks to the liberal licensing rules.  Banks were licensed with less than the 
required minimum capital and were allowed to pay out dividends of 50 percent and above 
even before having paid in the required minimum capital.  
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Banks inherited non-performing loans from the centrally planned economy.  Some of the 
loans extended to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were transformed into public debt in 
1991.  All remaining loans, extended to SOEs prior to December 30, 1990 and in arrears 
of more than 180 days, were replaced with government securities – ZUNK bonds in 1993 
and 1994.1 ZUNK bonds restored banks’ solvency only in a technical sense but could not 
improve their actual viability. Due to delayed reforms, poor management and lack of 
financial discipline, the newly extended loans in the first half of the 1990s soon turned 
into non-performing, and became one of the main causes for the banking sector crisis.  
Banks’ management was closely connected with its shareholders and borrowers-mainly 
private companies.  This contributed to the growth of non-performing loans not only in 
state-owned banks but also in the newly established private banks.    
 
The existing legislation was underdeveloped in terms of undertaking actions against 
insolvent banks. The Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) powers were quite limited, as it 
could not close failed banks.  The Law on Banks and Credit Activity (LBCA) did not 
provide any legal basis for the BNB to place banks into conservatorship. Banks were 
explicitly excluded from the 1994 Insolvency Law, as it was believed that the owner of 
state-owned banks would be able to close an insolvent bank, while the withdrawal of the 
license by the BNB would be quite sufficient in order to open a liquidation procedure for 
private banks.   
 
Weak banking supervision and non-compliance with prudential regulations was a major 
problem. The BNB had limited supervisory power over private and state-owned banks 
that fell under the authority of the BCC. Some of the BNB Banking Supervision 
Department (BSD) shortcomings stemmed from the limited authority the LBCA and the 
BNB Law (BNBL) gave the BSD to implement the BNB prudential regulations. 
Deficiencies were observed in bank disclosure, monitoring of large loan exposure, capital 
adequacy, etc. The BSD could not develop and implement procedures for a rapid and 
predictable response to violations of prudential regulations as a result of which some 
prudential regulations were systematically violated.   One example is the violation of 
BNB provisioning standards. Between 1994 and 1995 the ratio of the average actual 
provisioning relative to the required provisioning fell from 12.5 percent to 10.7 percent.   
 
The BNB classified non-performing loans in three categories: Doubtful A, Doubtful B 
and Unrecoverable.2 Based on them, the BNB provisioning standards required 
provisioning only for arrears in principal, not interest. In most cases provisions were 
made only to the extent that banks made profits. Provisioning expenses, which would 
result in net losses, were not permitted.   
                                                 
1 Claims on SOEs were transferred to the Ministry of Finance and restructured.  Two types of bonds, called 
ZUNK bonds after the name of the Law on the Settlement of Non-Performing Loans, were issued.  Lev-
denominated loans were replaced by 25 –year lev-denominated ZUNK bonds, and foreign currency- 
denominated loans were replaced by 25-year dollar-denominated ZUNK bonds. 
2 Category Doubtful A included lev and foreign currency loans with 30-day arrears.  These loans were 
expected to be provisioned at a rate of 20 percent.  Category Doubtful B included lev and foreign currency 
loans with 60-day arrears.  They had to be provisioned at 50 percent.  Category Unrecoverable loans 
included loans in lev and foreign currency with arrears of 90 days.   
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Table 2.  Losses and Liabilities of State-Owned Enterprises (in percent of GDP) 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 H1-1998 
Total losses -7.4 -5.6 -7.1 -2.9 -3.8 
Total liabilities  76.2 60.8 94.6 37.1 32.7 
Bank credit* 39.2 23.6 35.4 13.8 12.5 
Bank credit arrears in % of bank credit 12.9 19.3 20.2 18.0 12.0 
Source: NSI, MOF IMF estimates 
These data are bank claims on enterprises collected by the MOF  
 
Enterprise restructuring was crucial for Bulgaria but had been delayed for years. The 
period before the 1996-1997 crisis was characterized by lack of political commitment to 
reform the enterprise sector.   
 
Poor governance and soft budget constraints remained a serious problem of the SOE 
sector, and resulted in weak financial performance. Key obstacles to improving financial 
discipline included inadequate exit policy and shortcomings in accounting practices.  The 
SOE managers relied heavily on bank credit to keep them open.  Weak financial 
discipline in both enterprises and banks resulted in an increase in enterprise arrears on 
bank credit.  (Table 2.)  The share of bank credit arrears increased from about 13 percent 
in end-1994 to 19 percent in end-1995, indicating that weak financial discipline in both 
SOEs and banks deteriorated in the eve of the crisis. The BNB had been refinancing 
banks to keep them going. 
 
Table 3. Bulgaria: Bank Portfolios as of December 1995 (BGL million) 
 Performing 
Loans 
Doubtful (A) 
Loans 
Doubtful (B) 
Loans 
Unrecoverable 
Loans 
Loans 
Total 
Total 
Assets 
Doubtful B+ 
Unrecove-
rable 
Doubtful A+ 
B+Unrecove-
rable 
State banks     59 165    202 358        7 622      47 592    316 740    661 584      55 214    257 572  
Private banks     60 688      47 781      13 014      24 317    145 800    249 124      37 331      85 112  
Total   119 853    250 139      20 636      71 909    462 540    910 708      92 545    342 684  
Source: BNB 
 
At the end of 1995 the tension and vulnerabilities in the banking sector intensified, 
resulting from the accumulation of longstanding structural factors, related to the absence 
of hard budget constraints in SOEs, poor bank management and lack of enforcement of 
supervisory standards. At the end of 1995 the unrecoverable and non-performing loans in 
banks increased. The Bulgarian banking sector had BGL 71 909 million unrecoverable 
loans or close to16 percent of the banking sector loan portfolio and about 8 percent of 
banks’ total assets (Table 3).  66 percent of the unrecoverable loans belonged to state 
owned banks whose share in the assets of the banking system was about 73 percent.  The 
remaining 34 percent of the unrecoverable loans belonged to the private banks (Table 3.). 
The non-performing loans (Doubtful A and B together with category Unrecoverable 
loans) amounted to about 70 percent of total loans (more than 30 percent of total assets). 
Behind these discouraging figures on non-performing loans that signaled serious 
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weaknesses in the banking sector, there were significant differences in individual banks, 
as the two largest state-owned banks were sound.3  
 
The banking sector financial weaknesses were the basis on which the banking crisis 
unfolded. Despite repeated re-capitalization of some banks by the government, the 
financial condition of the banking system could not improve because the underlying 
weaknesses had not been addressed and banks continued to lend without paying sufficient 
attention to borrowers’ indebtedness and creditworthiness. The growth of non-performing 
loans began seriously affecting banks’ financial position and net worth. Banks’ “losses”, 
identified in 1995 according to Bulgarian accounting standards4 totaled about BGL 25 
billion.  In compliance with these standards, the losses were subtracted from capital.  
Estimates about banks’ net worth were quite different when using Bulgarian and 
International standards.  Estimates based on international standards, showed that at the 
end of July 1996, many banks had negative net worth and needed substantial re-
capitalization to achieve required levels of loan loss provisions and the international 
capital adequacy standards. Banks had already been experiencing serious liquidity and 
solvency problems. The authorities were aware that many of them were technically 
bankrupt. 
 
1.2. Macroeconomic Vulnerabilities 
 
The banking and currency crisis unfolded in a deteriorating macroeconomic environment, 
characterized by declining GDP and accelerating inflation (Table 4). A BNB study on 
inflation, using VAR models and monthly data indicates that the exchange rate of lev 
versus the dollar, ex-post inflation rate and monetary base were the main factors behind 
inflation prior to the currency board introduction (Yotzov, V. et al., 1998). The exchange 
rate influenced inflation through inflationary expectations and fuel prices that are usually 
quoted in dollars.  Prior to the currency board introduction the exchange rate itself had 
been strongly influenced by the declining BNB foreign exchange reserves and 
expectations about their further decline5 (Chart 5).  
 
The 1996-1997 crisis was both a banking sector and a currency crisis linked not only to 
the banking sector weaknesses but also to the external balance vulnerabilities.  They were 
at the heart of the 1996 currency crisis and aggravated the banking sector crisis. The 
                                                 
3 Some of the major state owned banks had the worst performing portfolios.  However, the two largest state-
owned banks Bulbank and State Savings Bank (SSB) were in sound condition. Three state-owned banks 
(UBB, Expressbank, Biochim) were involved in improving their operational efficiency and showed 
improved results in making new loans during 1995.  In the private sector there were also some banks that 
were actively trying to restructure and improve their operations and others that were not. 
4 In 1995 and 1996 estimates of the aggregate position of the Bulgarian banks were based mainly on 
Bulgarian accounting standards.  Based on Bulgarian accounting standards and some limited adjustments to 
international standards, as of end-1995, 20 banks had negative net worth, with a total negative net worth of 
some BG L 96 billion.   Five state-owned banks, one private bank and the bank taken over by the BNB had 
negative net worth greater than BGL 7 billion.   
5 Inflation began subsiding in March and April 1997 only after the IMF announced it would renew its 
financial support for Bulgaria. 
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overall balance of payments marked a record high deficit of 8.5 percent of GDP, which 
was a result mainly of the capital account deficit of about 9.4 percent of GDP. The 
balance of payments weaknesses and related currency crisis in 1996 were linked to high 
external debt service obligations and short-term capital outflows, which intensified as 
residents began withdrawing savings from the banking system, while the authorities had 
difficulties controlling the outflows leaving the country.  Reflecting Bulgaria’s delayed 
start to financial stabilization and economic reform, direct investment was relatively low 
in comparison to other transition economies, while portfolio investment was negative.   
 
Bulgaria’s high external debt and debt service burden coupled with insufficient foreign 
currency reserves to service the maturing obligations. In 1996 and 1997 the debt-to-GDP 
ratio reached close to 112 percent and 104 percent correspondingly.  Total external debt 
service in percent of GDP increased from 8 percent in 1995 to close to 13 percent in 
1996.  Total external debt service in percent of exports increased from 15.5 percent in 
1995 to 20 percent in 1996. At the same time by the end of 1996, foreign exchange 
reserves, excluding gold fell to only 0.9 months of imports and continued falling in the 
beginning of 1997 (Table 4, Chart 5). The decline in BNB foreign currency reserves 
influenced the exchange rate depreciation and inflation. 
 
Table 4.  Bulgaria: Selected Economic Indicators 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
 Annual growth, %    
Real GDP 1.8 2.9 -10.1 -7.0 3.5 
CPI, average annual 96.0 62.1 123.0 1082.3 22.3 
 % of GDP    
Current account balance (BOP) 
Capital account balance (BOP) 
Overall balance (BOP) 
-1.7 
2.5 
-4.3 
-0.2 
2.8 
2.6 
0.8 
-9.4 
-8.5 
4.2 
6.5 
10.7 
-2.2 
1.9* 
1.2* 
Foreign Direct Investment (US$ million) 105.0 98.0 138.0 507.0 401.0 
    %of GDP     
Overall fiscal balance*** -5.8 -5.6 -10.4 -2.1 1.0 
Public debt 
Public external debt 
External debt service 
149.9 
103.0 
10.0 
106.4 
 69.0 
8.0 
111.8 
90.0 
12.8 
104.4 
90.0 
10.3 
76.0** 
73.0** 
   8.8* 
External debt service (in % of export) 
External debt service (US$ million)  
18.7 
970.0 
15.5 
1 049.0 
20.0 
1 259.0 
16.5 
1 046.0 
19.4* 
1 114.0 
BNB gross int’l reserves, US$ million 1311.0 1546.0 793.0 2474.0 3056.0* 
(in months of imports of G&S) 2.4 3.1 1.6 5.2 6.3* 
BNB int’l reserves excl. gold, US$ million 1 002.0 1 236.0 483.0 2164.0 2180.0** 
(in months of imports of G&S) 2.1 2.1 0.9 4.2 5.2* 
Source: BNB, NSI, IMF and WB estimates 
*   IMF estimates 
** September 1998 
*** Consolidated government balance 
 
Bulgaria’s access to private creditors was limited, and the official multilateral creditors 
were the only source of new financing flows.  In the first half of 1996 Bulgaria had not 
signed an agreement with the IMF yet.  The Fourth Stand-by Arrangement (SBA), signed 
in mid-1996, was short-lived – only one tranche was disbursed, after which IMF 
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financing was interrupted. Left without any external financing, and with rapidly depleting 
foreign currency reserves Bulgaria was on the verge of a second default on its external 
debt.  Similar expectations fueled further nominal exchange rate depreciation, contributed 
to the exacerbation of confidence crisis in both domestic currency and banks and 
encouraged runs on foreign currency deposits.   
 
Table 5.  Bulgaria: Selected Monetary Indicators and Interest Rates 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
M3/GDP, % 79.5 66.3 74.9 35.3 30.6 
M3, nominal annual growth, eop, % 78.6 39.6 124.5 359.3 9.6 
M3, real annual growth, eop, % -19.5 4.9 -45.4 -32.3 8.5 
Real base interest rate, annualized, % 12.05 2.36 -69.3 -10.5 14.4 
Real deposit interest rate, annualized, % -4.48 -7.89 -82.1 -13.8 12.4 
Source: BNB, NSI, IMF, World Bank 
 
Persistent fiscal deficits that grew substantially in 1996 became another factor behind the 
financial sector crisis. The huge overall fiscal deficit contributed to loose monetary 
policies and financial market crisis, which affected confidence in the financial position of 
banks, which kept substantial amounts of government securities in their portfolios. 
Despite the primary balance surplus of 9 percent of GDP, the 1996 budget became 
untenable as the growing interest expenditures contributed to an overall fiscal balance 
deficit of more than 10 percent of GDP (Table 4). Owing mainly to the increase in 
domestic interest payments, interest expenditures grew from 14 percent of GDP in 1995 
to about 20 percent of GDP in 1996. The growing burden of interest expenditures put 
limits on BNB interest rate policy and contributed to low nominal and negative real 
deposit rates that further exacerbated confidence crisis in the national currency and banks. 
As fiscal balance difficulties intensified, confidence in the government securities markets 
also deteriorated. Under these circumstances the huge budget deficit had to be financed 
by the central bank, leading to loss of monetary control.  
 
In 1995 the growth of M2 and M3 was linked both to the recovery of real demand for 
money, and to some money creation (Table 5).  The BNB resisted nominal exchange rate 
appreciation pressures that appeared in early 1995 by intervening heavily in the foreign 
exchange market.  These interventions contributed to an increase in official reserves from 
about US$ 1 billion in end-1994 to US$ 1.2 billion (US$ 1.5 billion including gold) in 
end-1995 and to some money creation. In end-1995 the overall BNB lev refinancing 
marked a decline in comparison to end-1994, while foreign currency refinancing 
increased (Table 6).  Following the decline in inflation to about 62 percent (average 
annual), the central bank rate (base interest) fell from 66 percent in mid-1995 to 39 
percent in end-1995, bringing real deposit rates to negative levels.  In late 1995-early 
1996 real deposit rates were kept negative and together with rumors about bank 
insolvencies contributed to bank runs on the leading private bank and smaller banks. The 
fragility of the banking system together with high interest expenditures and fiscal balance 
weaknesses prevented the BNB from raising the base interest rate. At the same time the 
growing need to refinance ailing banks and provide direct credit to the government, 
contributed to a gradual loss of monetary control, especially having in mind that loss of 
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confidence in banks and domestic currency resulted in a decline in the demand for lev 
money.   In 1996 all monetary aggregates registered negative real growth rates, reflecting 
the depth of confidence crisis (Table 5).   
 
Table 6.    BNB: Net Domestic Assets (BGL, billion) 
 1994 
 Dec. 
1995 
Dec. 
1996 
Mar.  
1996 
June 
1996 
Sep. 
1996 
Dec. 
1997  
Mar.  
1997  
June 
1997  
Sep. 
1997 
Dec. 
Net domestic assets 100.3 116.2 136.7 180.6 287.0 481.6 1,174.5 -469.4 -754.5 -545.3 
Government credit (net) 41.4 25.6 59.8 48.9 98.3 222.0 398.2 35.3 -216.7 -71.6 
    Of which securities 13.0 50.6 73.2 78.1 139.7 272.9 523.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Claims on DMB (forex) 18.6 20.5 24.9 46.4 64.8 113.4 348.2 159.6 159.6 181.9 
Claims on DMB (BGL): 28.9 24.2 37.0 66.5 79.2 125.40 139.10 152.5 155.4 152.7 
      Deposits 0.1 11.4 29.2 52.9 54.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
      Lombard loans  22.5 1.0 3.0 3.9 6.2 6.2 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
      Discount credit 1.3 2.1 1.3 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
      Overdrafts 4.6 5.6 0.3 0.3 0.1 61.1 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.0 
      Arrears 0.3 0.8 1.2 7.0 16.1 56.1 54.8 53.4 53.4 53.4 
      Other 0.0 3.3 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 82.9 98.7 101.7 99.3 
Other items net 11.4 45.9 15.0 18.8 18.8 20.8 289.0 -816.8 -852.8 -808.3 
BGL/USD 66.0 70.7 78.8 155.5 230.0 487.4 1,588.7 1,718.6 1,762.8 1,776.5 
Source: BNB 
 
2. The 1996-1997 Crisis Episode 
 
The crisis episode covered the period between spring-1996 and spring-1997. The dual 
banking sector and currency crisis began gaining momentum in the first half of 1996 and 
peaked in the second half of 1996 and early 1997 (Table 1.). The banking sector crisis 
coincided with a currency crisis, the two mutually reinforced each other and resulted in a 
general confidence crisis in the last quarter of 1996--early 1997. About one third of 
Bulgarian banks faced liquidity and solvency problems. The currency crisis was 
characterized by large depreciation of the national currency that took place during the 
banking crisis.  
 
2.1. The Dual Crisis 
 
In early 1996 banks’ financial weaknesses and liquidity problems together with declining 
BNB foreign exchange reserves became the main factors behind bank runs, especially on 
foreign currency deposits. Loss of BNB foreign currency reserves was observed due 
mainly to huge external debt repayments, amounting to more than USD 1.2 billion (Table 
4). In the summer of 1996 and September 1996 there were significant withdrawals of 
foreign currency deposits from banks as well as outflow of lev funds into stronger banks. 
Banks’ weaknesses and depleting BNB reserves fed rumors about specific banks and 
blockage of foreign currency deposits. Massive runs on foreign currency deposits  
contributed to the depletion of commercial banks’ foreign currency reserves.  
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Chart 1.   Bulgaria: Foreign Currency Deposits and Exchange Rate 
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Once the BNB foreign exchange reserves excluding gold fell below the critical threshold 
of USD 500 million and the lev rapidly depreciated, foreign currency deposit withdrawals 
from banks intensified.  The BNB refinancing of banks and the government prevailed at 
different periods of time (Table 6), each one contributing to the money supply growth, 
loss of monetary control, inflation and further lev depreciation. The public lost 
confidence in banks and the depreciating lev and preferred to keep foreign currency 
savings outside banks. At the same time the withdrawn lev deposits put additional 
pressure on the demand for dollars contributing to further lev depreciation. Large arrears 
in the payment system caused system-wide liquidity problems, intensified loss of 
confidence in the system and together with large lev depreciation contributed to a general 
confidence crisis in September 1996.  
 
The massive runs on foreign currency deposits became a typical feature of the Bulgarian 
banking crisis, reflecting its interdependence with the currency crisis.  Most of the foreign 
currency deposits were dollar-denominated deposits.  Runs on foreign currency deposits  
in dollar terms intensified together with the depreciation of the national currency versus 
the dollar (Chart 1). Once the lev stabilized in 1997 the decline in foreign currency 
deposits stabilized too. 
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Chart 2.  Bulgaria: Total Deposits, Lev Deposits, and Foreign Currency Deposits 
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Lev deposits did not show any significant decline during the crisis episode, as in most  
cases they were withdrawn from ailing banks and transferred to SSB, which was 
considered sound and enjoyed public confidence (Chart 2).  The foreign currency deposits 
expressed in lev terms kept increasing together with lev depreciation, which contributed 
to the growth of total deposits, expressed in lev terms and correspondingly to the decline 
in the ratio of currency in circulation--to-- all types of deposits included in M36 (Chart 2., 
Chart 3).   
 
Chart 3 Currency-to-Deposit Ratio 
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Source: BNB 
                                                 
6  During the Bulgarian banking crisis not only demand deposits included in M1, as suggested by Tang, Zoli 
and Klytchnikova  (2001) but all types of deposits, especially foreign currency deposits, became subject to 
withdrawals by depositors, which made the ratio of currency to all deposits in M3 a more meaningful 
indicator.   
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2.2. The First Wave of Crisis 
  
In the end of 1995 and early 1996 banks’ financial position began rapidly deteriorating 
and banks began experiencing liquidity problems. The public also became aware of the 
banking crisis, as banks developed liquidity shortages, especially in foreign currency, and 
queues outside banks began increasing.  In the spring of 1996 bank runs began 
intensifying due to rumors about weaknesses and problems in specific banks, 
accompanied by fears of foreign currency deposit blockage, linked to the depleting BNB 
foreign exchange reserves. Two banks of significant size experienced serious bank runs. 
Simultaneously large volumes of pending payments (arrears) in the payment system 
emerged, causing liquidity shortages in other banks and seriously impairing public 
confidence in the banking system.  The BNB met these challenges by providing liquidity, 
while at the same time the SSB increased inter-bank lending. 
 
In early 1996 the authorities recognized that banks were facing serious problems but by 
that time the LBCA did not provide the BNB with the legal basis for placing concervators 
in banks. In May 1996 they acknowledged the existence of the crisis and decided to 
amend the banking legislation in order to be able to take action. The May amendments to 
the LBCA empowered the BNB Management Board to protect banks’ creditors and to 
make decisions on establishing a bank’s bankruptcy. On these legal grounds the BNB 
made a decision to place into concervatorship two large banks (First Private and 
Mineralbank) and three smaller banks.  It applied to the court system to request 
insolvency of those banks but failed to withdraw their licenses as courts rejected the BNB 
assessment of banks’ financial weaknesses.  
 
Chart 4.  Currency Substitution, Exchange Rate and CPI Inflation 
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To meet the first wave of bank closures in May 1996 the authorities passed a temporary 
Law on State Protection of Deposits and Accounts with Commercial Banks. Depositor 
protection law provided for BGL 80 billion and a small amount of foreign currency 
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resources to cover 100 percent of household deposits and 50 percent of enterprise 
deposits.  Households and enterprises were able to collect the value of their lev deposits 
at the SSB.  Household foreign currency deposits were payable over two years in six-
monthly installments at the Postbank.  
 
The May attempts to limit the crisis by placing 5 banks into concervatorship, and by re-
capitalizing the state-owned banks through transfer of ZUNK bonds to the BCC and then 
to the ailing banks, did not bring about the expected outcome and runs on deposits, 
especially foreign currency deposits, continued in the subsequent months. Memoranda of 
Understanding (MOU) between the BNB and 19 state-owned banks with negative capital 
adequacy ratios were signed in order to improve their financial position. Banks that 
signed MOU were expected to undertake measures to collect loans, cut operating costs, 
limit interest rates on deposits, restructure and sell assets to improve liquidity. Banks that 
signed MOU were forbidden to extend new loans prior to achieving a viable capital 
adequacy ratio.   
 
The measures introduced in May 1996 had only a temporary effect and could hardly put 
an end to bank runs. They proved insufficient to curb the banking sector crisis and bank 
runs, as they failed to address the major causes for banks’ weaknesses and took place in 
the absence of serious bank and corporate sector restructuring and privatization.   
 
By mid- 1996 liquidity position of banks seriously deteriorated, there were lines of 
customers outside many banks, seeking to withdraw deposits and banks introduced limits 
on both amount and timing for deposit withdrawals.  Those banks that could afford to 
maintain high excess reserves did so and refused to invest in government securities, even 
at higher interest rates. Liquidity was inadequate and resulted in delays in the payment 
system, with payment arrears over BGL 9 billion despite several BNB attempts to clear 
them.  
 
Table 7.  Banks’ Foreign Currency Assets and Deposits 
 Dec-95 March-96 June-96 Sept-96 Dec-96 March-97 June-97 
Foreign Assets, mln USD 1426 1447 1192 1235 1248 1331 1547 
Foreign Currency Deposits*, 
mln USD 2245 2083 1661 1525 1357 1311 1399 
BGL/USD Exchange Rate 70.7 78.8 155.5 230 487.4 1588.7 1718.6 
Source: BNB, IMF 
* Includes foreign currency time deposits of households, SOEs and the private sector. 
 
Simultaneously the BNB foreign exchange reserves continued declining due to debt 
repayments, interventions in the foreign exchange market and foreign currency 
refinancing to ailing banks. In addition, expectations about further depletion of BNB 
foreign currency reserves, lev  depreciation and fears of blockage of foreign currency 
deposits contributed to foreign currency deposit withdrawals. While foreign currency 
deposits kept increasing by the end of 1995, they fell by some 25 percent in early June 
and the subsequent months (Table 7, Chart 1). Some of the lev deposits were transferred 
into SSB or transferred into dollar cash. Simultaneously banks began transforming their 
lev deposits into foreign currency assets (Table 7).  At the end of July 1996, the total long 
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foreign currency position of all banks amounted to about BGL 26 billion, or 20 percent of 
existing capital7. These figures did not include off-balance sheet exposures such as 
forward contracts, swap contracts, options, or futures.  
 
In late July 1996 the IV IMF-supported Stand-by Arrangement (SBA) was signed. Both 
the adoption of the stabilization program and the provision of external financing from the 
IMF (about USD 185 million) and the EU (about USD 50 million) brought about a short-
lived stability to the markets. In August official reserves increased temporary, 
contributing to a slowdown in lev depreciation, inflation and foreign currency deposit 
runs (Chart 5, Chart 1).  However, the banking sector and currency crisis regained 
strength soon, as the resolution of the underlying macroeconomic and sector weaknesses 
was delayed.  
 
 
2.3. Crisis Escalation 
 
The first wave of bank closures fell short of stabilizing the system and in September 1996 
banks’ liquidity problems intensified again. The negative effects of keeping 
undercapitalized banks in the system resulted in growing negative cash flow, interest 
arrears and further deterioration of quality of banks’ loan portfolios. Additional 
contributing factors were the slow resolution of banks in conservatorship, insufficient and 
inefficient re-capitalization and lack of privatization in the corporate and banking sectors. 
Deposit outflows, queues and delays in payments of deposits occurred in all banks 
throughout the country. 
 
Loss of monetary control due mainly to the escalating fiscal problems also fueled the 
crisis through inflation and lev depreciation. Once lev depreciation began accelerating, 
foreign currency deposit outflows intensified too. In September 1996 the strong 
interdependence between the BNB foreign currency reserves, inflation, lev depreciation, 
and runs on foreign currency deposits further intensified (Chart 4, Chart 5).  The lev 
became extremely vulnerable to the progressive decline in foreign currency reserves, 
especially when they fell below the critical threshold of US$ 500 million and no further 
external financing was anticipated any longer. The lev depreciation and associated runs 
on foreign currency deposits were fueled not only by the actual decline in the BNB 
foreign exchange reserves but also by expectations of further foreign exchange decline, 
associated with expected external debt payments (Table 4). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 The IMF estimates showed that the total open position of all banks represented 99 percent of adjusted for 
required loss reserves capital of banks. 
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Chart 5.  BNB Foreign Exchange Reserves, Exchange Rate, and CPI Inflation 
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The banking sector confidence crisis spilled over to the government security markets and 
the payment system.  Banks limited their participation in the government debt market as 
they feared further deposit withdrawals. In addition, there were sizable delays in the 
payment system, which threatened to lead to contagion and spread the crisis to relatively 
sound banks.  These developments required from the BNB to provide refinancing to 
banks and the government, which undermined its ability to control money supply.  
 
Identifying the General Confidence Crisis 
 
As the Bulgarian crisis was both a banking sector and a currency crisis that reinforced 
each other and led to a general confidence crisis, a set of criteria had to be introduced in 
order to identify the general confidence crisis. The set of criteria was developed within 
the framework of a BNB Contingency Plan drafted with the IMF assistance. The 
Contingency Plan was based on the assumption that in case the IV SBA became no longer 
sustainable certain emergency measures had to be undertaken in order to make sure that 
further deterioration in confidence in the banking sector would be avoided.   
 
The following set of specific criteria was selected on the basis of which the BNB and the 
government were expected to identify the emergence of a general confidence crisis:  
 
• An increase in the overall amount of pending payments during 5 consecutive days 
to more than BGL 11 billion in August, BGL 10 billion in September, etc.; 
• Violation of the BNB refinancing limits during 5 consecutive days; 
• BNB refinancing of two or more big banks; 
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• Further depreciation of the national currency by more than BGL 200 per USD 1 
for about one week; 
• Further depletion of foreign exchange reserves, excluding gold to below USD 
400million. 
 
The emergence of at least two or more of these symptoms would be considered a signal 
for inconsistencies and failures in the economic and structural reforms that would lead to 
a general confidence crisis. 
 
In September 1996 the financial system experienced symptoms closed to those defined by 
the Contingency Plan: 
 
• The overall pending payments in the settlement system grew above BGL 10 
billion. Since September 19 they had been consistently exceeding BGL 12 billion, 
exposing the system to the risk of collapse.  
 
• After the IV SBA approval the BNB limited its refinancing in compliance with the 
September performance criterion on the stock of BNB unsecured refinancing to 
banks. Though the extension of new unsecured refinancing was limited, the BNB 
extended the term to maturity of maturing loans of about 6 banks, which 
contributed to more than doubling loan arrears since end-June 1996. 
 
• The BNB foreign exchange reserves, excluding gold did not fall below USD 400 
million but the critical threshold turned out to be USD 500 million.  The program 
of the IV SBA set the September limit on the minimum stock of net international 
reserves of the BNB at USD 434 million, while their actual amount was much 
lower. The September review of the IMF program signaled that the IMF would 
interrupt financing, which implied that the BNB foreign currency reserves would 
continue falling.  
 
• All main performance criteria of the IMF program were violated, except the 
criterion on the stock of BNB unsecured refinancing to banks. The program 
review concluded that the IMF program went off track, and the IV SBA was no 
longer sustainable.  
 
Addressing the General Confidence Crisis 
 
As the banking and currency crisis began accelerating the authorities recognized that only 
wide-ranging restructuring of the banking sector could restore confidence in banks. The 
BNB Board and the high level Emergency Committee drafted a resolution strategy in 
close collaboration with the IMF.  The primary goal of the bank resolution strategy was to 
stabilize the monetary system and restore confidence in banks. The objective was to 
minimize the cost of the operation.  
 
Based on the strategy, the BNB bank restructuring plan envisaged placing all non-viable 
banks into conservatorship and providing refinancing only to viable banks. A set of banks 
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to be closed without delays was selected using specific indicators. The key selection 
criteria were banks’ regular liquidity problems and negative capital adequacy ratios. 
Based on them the BNB placed another nine banks into conservatorship on September 23. 
Together with the banks put earlier under conservatorship they represented about one 
third of the banking system.  
 
The BNB and the government reached an agreement on changing the rules of the 
generous deposit guarantee scheme and announced that the deposit insurance payments 
would be deferred until courts declared banks under conservatorship bankrupt. There 
were also suggestions to introduce a new less generous depositor protection scheme by 
introducing a mixture of a limited up-front cash payment and a bond issue for non-
household depositors. The Bulgarian authorities were aware of the high costs of the 
existing deposit insurance scheme, but having in mind the deteriorating confidence in the 
banking sector, combined with escalating confidence crisis in the national currency, they 
considered the introduction of a new less generous deposit insurance scheme in the 
middle of the crisis highly risky.   
 
The BNB was aware that it should provide protection to stronger banks both immediately 
and in the medium term. In the medium term the viable banks had to be protected through 
increasing their positive net worth and raising their capitalization. However, the 
immediate protection implied liquidity support in case of testing.  The BNB declared its 
immediate support for viable banks and announced openly it would stand fully behind 
viable banks by: 
 
• Purchasing government securities-both repo and outright purchases- in the open 
market; 
• Providing collateralized and uncollateralized lev-denominated refinancing to 
banks; 
• Restoring banks’ access to 50 percent of their required reserves. 
 
Following a standard IMF recommendation the BNB raised the monthly base interest rate 
to 25 percent to regain confidence in lev and banks (See Box.2.).  It was believed that a 
policy measure like that would be appropriate because real interest rates were negative.   
 
In the next couple of weeks the remaining banks became subject to testing.  In October 
rumors that the Customs Service would shift its accounts caused runs on two banks. The 
withdrawn foreign currency deposits were sizable and represented about 1 percent of 
reserve money. There was one big state-owned bank subject to growing runs. The BNB 
provided mainly Lombard loans and refrained from refinancing in foreign exchange, as its 
foreign currency reserves were below the critical threshold. The total BNB claims on 
banks reached BGL 238.8 billion in the last quarter of 1996, which in dollar terms was 
much lower than that in the first half of 1996 (Table 6, Chart 6).  
 
As inflationary pressures began intensifying and the political crisis gained momentum, 
additional official interventions in the banking sector were considered inappropriate and 
were not undertaken. They were renewed in the first half of 1997 only after the political 
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turmoil was over and inflation subsided.  Only then the BNB placed another bank into 
concervatorship. 
 
Chart 6.  Claims on Deposit Money Banks (in US$) 
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In late 1996 and early 1997 CPI inflation began accelerating and in end-February the 
monthly rate peaked at 243 percent, while the lev reached its strongest depreciation at 
BGL 2 045.5 per dollar (Chart 5). Driven by the loss of monetary control due to BNB 
government financing, declining BNB foreign exchange reserves, political turmoil and 
inflationary expectations, hyper-inflationary rates emerged in January and February 1997. 
In fact, the highest inflation rates and strongest lev depreciation coincided with the lowest 
level of BNB foreign currency reserves in January and February 1996 when they fell 
below USD 450 million, excluding gold (Chart 5). Confidence in the national currency 
further deteriorated as the lev kept depreciating, and resulted in further intensification of 
currency substitution (Chart 4). Expectations about blockage of foreign currency deposits 
further contributed to some of the strongest foreign currency deposit withdrawals (Chart 
1).  These fears intensified especially in January and early February 1997 fueled by an 
information leakage to Reuters about an internal discussion on blockage of deposits. Only 
the BNB Board timely efforts managed to prevent a major attack on banks in a period of 
political turmoil, and demonstrations.  
 
3. Monetary Policy in the Second Half of 1996   
 
Monetary policy during the crisis episode was of particular importance, as it could 
contribute to either curbing or further intensifying the dual crisis.  In the second half of 
1996 the BNB monetary policy could be characterized by two sub-periods. The first one 
was the period during which the monetary policy was conducted following the IMF-
supported program of the IV SBA, which tried to put money supply under control (Box 
1.) The second period was the period when the BNB placed 9 banks into conservatorship 
 and implemented its package of measures, focusing on providing support for all viable 
banks (Box 2.).  
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dBox 1. Monetary Policy under the IV SBA 
 
The program of the IV SBA was an attempt to introduce consistent monetary policy in a period of escalating 
banking and currency crisis. The main objective of the BNB monetary policy was to curb inflation, stabilize the 
lev and restore confidence in domestic currency and banks.  The IV SBA introduced a money-based program, 
which targeted broad money and reserve money. In fact, as indicated in an IMF paper on Asian crisis (IMF, 
1999), conducting monetary policy through targeting monetary aggregates in a period of confidence crisis could 
hardly be successful because the demand for money becomes unstable as well as the relationship between 
operational, intermediate and final targets.   At the time of program preparation neither the BNB nor the IMF had 
any reliable estimates of the demand for money.  As in other countries, banking crisis affected the stability of 
demand for money and money velocity.  The variability of the monetary aggregates increased during the crisis 
period, and no money-based stabilization program could be successful under those circumstances. (Table 8.) 
 
Table 8.  Standard Deviation of Selected Monetary Indicators and Money Multiplier 
 Jan.94-Jan.95 Jan.95-Jan.96 Jan.96-Jan.97 
Demand deposits/M3 0.41 0.67 0.77 
Quasi Money/M3 0.71 0.83 1.63 
Money multiplier 0.25 0.33 0.23 
 
In fact, in September and October 1996, the IMF recommended to monitor a set of indicators that would signal 
money demand shifts. It also warned that the uncertainty about demand for money shifts could lead to policy 
actions that might be inappropriately accommodating or too restrictive (IMF, October 1996). 
 
Monetary management was complicated not only due to the banking and currency crisis but also due to the 
continuously growing borrowing needs of the government.  By that time it had already become quite obvious that 
the only way to restrain the currency crisis was to ensure some increase in the BNB foreign exchange reserves 
and the BNB made strong efforts to obey any recommendations made by the IMF, in order to qualify for Fund 
support.  However, the BNB could not meet the indicative targets for reserve money and the September IMF 
mission concluded that the BNB appeared to have lost the ability to follow the monetary aggregate as a nominal 
anchor due to: 
 
• fiscal deterioration, which alone would have been enough to provide the most serious testing ground for the 
strength and commitment of any monetary management regime; fiscal difficulties were experienced due to 
rapid declines in revenues and a significant increase in expenditure linked to falling due of substantial 
amounts of domestic and foreign debt; 
• sluggish real sector activity; 
• growing banking sector instability; 
• further depreciation of the national currency and loss of confidence in it; 
• controversial monetary policy.  18 
n the second half of 1996 the BNB conducted its monetary policy following the 
ndicative targets and performance criteria set by the IMF money-based stabilization 
rogram under the IV SBA.  The BNB could hardly meet the indicative targets for reserve 
oney. Its attempts to stay within or at least closer to the Fund-supported program 
erformance criteria were doomed to failure from the very beginning, as one key 
erformance criterion of the program – limits on the stock of BNB net domestic assets – 
ent off track at the time of SBA Board approval. The program was unsustainable and 
isbursements were interrupted in September 1996 (Box 1.).   
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Once the IMF financial support was no longer available, monetary conditions deteriorated 
and went out of control in the subsequent couple of months. As currency crisis 
accelerated, confidence in lev deteriorated and affected demand for money. Inflation 
intensified further on due to declining demand for real money, and loss of control over 
money supply. Between December 1996 and February 1997 demand for real lev currency 
and deposits declined by more than 60 percent, while velocity of money skyrocketed.  
While demand for real money balances began to decline, the refinancing needs of banks 
and especially the borrowing needs of the government kept fuelling money supply 
growth. The political turmoil that took place after the resignation of the socialist 
government in December 1996 and the subsequent deadlock strongly influenced 
inflationary expectations and inflation.  
 
The main channels through which the BNB made liquidity infusions were lending to the 
government and bank refinancing.  
 
In the second half of 1996 the BNB infused liquidity through lending to the government 
and participating in the primary auctions of government securities (Table 6). Net claims 
on the government became the main contributor to money supply growth and inflation, as 
government finances deteriorated significantly. On the expenditure side significant 
amounts of domestic and foreign debt fell due, while revenue collection faced serious 
problems. Direct credit to the government became a necessity because the government 
securities markets faced a severe confidence crisis exactly at the time when the budget 
deficit increased significantly due to poor revenue performance, and rising interest 
expenditures.  The September increase in the base interest rate to 25 percent monthly rate 
brought about a substantial increase in interest payments on domestic debt putting 
additional pressure on interest expenditure of the budget.  Its subsequent gradual lowering 
to 20 percent in mid -October and 15 percent in end-October did not prove sufficient to 
alleviate the burden on the budget, which at that time faced revenue collection 
difficulties. That rather complicated situation resulted in reliance on direct credit from the 
BNB.   
 
The size of the fiscal gap was much larger and exceeded the limit on short-term loans, set 
by the BNB Law, within which the BNB was allowed to lend to the government.  
Nevertheless, the latest Amendments to the State Budget Law provided the legal basis for 
extending new BNB loans to the government. Thus the government was able to obtain 
from the BNB a loan amounting to BGL 115 billion by the end of 1996. The news of the 
loan extension stimulated further on inflationary expectations and contributed to 
hyperinflationary rates – a consequence that was envisaged by the BNB and explained by 
its Management Board in a letter to the Government and Parliament.  
 
Liquidity difficulties of some of the banks also required refinancing in order to avoid the 
risks that the pending payments in the payment system would spread the liquidity 
problems and would contaminate healthy banks. In addition the BNB wished to avoid the 
possibility that the inability of some banks to meet the demand for deposit withdrawals 
would lead to a complete loss of confidence in these banks. The BNB refinanced banks 
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that were considered sound and whose failure would represent a systemic risk. Some 
banks obtained refinancing also from the SSB. Between July and September the BNB 
kept providing its refinancing to banks8 within the limits set by the IMF-supported 
program and met the performance criterion of the IV SBA on the stock of unsecured 
refinancing of banks.  
 
Following the explicit IMF recommendation, that once the ailing banks had been 
eliminated, the BNB should stand behind the remaining viable banks, by providing 
emergency liquidity assistance to avoid panic runs, the BNB made a clear announcement 
that it would follow this type of policy when it placed 9 additional banks into  
conservatorship (Box 2.).  Consistent with its promises, the BNB increased its refinancing 
in nominal terms-both in domestic and foreign currency-between September 1996 and 
March 1997 (Table 6). However, calculated in dollar terms the BNB refinancing had been 
declining since March 1996 remaining below its December 1994 and December 1995 
level (Chart 6). 
 
Throughout the entire crisis period the BNB tried to sterilize the liquidity infusions 
through its open market operations, reserves management and interventions on the 
foreign exchange market.   
 
Once the IV SBA was signed the BNB conducted daily its open market operations, trying 
to sterilize liquidity in order to meet its indicative targets for the monetary base (reserve 
money), set by the IMF-supported stabilization program. The daily reverse repurchases 
auctions were designed consistent with the reserve money target. They were used to effect 
short-term changes in the monetary stance. In fact, the drive for stronger sterilizations 
through open market operations increased further interest rates, brought about higher 
interest payments and overall fiscal deficit and contributed to difficulties in servicing  the 
domestic debt.   
 
Being aware of the limitations of the rest of its monetary policy instruments, the BNB had 
to make use of the minimum reserve requirements as an active monetary policy 
instrument even at the time when the banking sector crisis began aggravating. However, 
the BNB used this instrument with caution, as it was aware that using the reserve 
requirements as an active instrument of monetary policy in a period of crisis would be 
problematic because the exact measurement of the liquidity stance was complicated, and 
the appropriate increase in the reserve requirements would be very difficult to determine.   
In addition, most of the excess liquidity was not held in bank accounts but in the form of 
foreign exchange cash and other valuables outside the banking system. In August 1996, 
the BNB tightened the reserve requirements from 8 percent to 10 percent of banks’ 
deposit liabilities.  In addition, the BNB decreased the accessible funds from 50 to 10 
percent of the required amount.  However, in September, after the BNB placed nine 
additional banks under conservatorship, it relaxed its reserve policy by increasing again 
banks’ access to required reserves (Box 2).  
 
                                                 
8 The quarterly increase in BNB claims on banks was BGL 31 billion in end-September 1996 against BGL 
51 billion in end -June 1996 (Table 6).  
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Chart 7.  BNB Foreign Exchange Reserves, Sales of US$ and Exchange Rate 
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Attempts to smooth sharp exchange rate fluctuations and restrain strong lev depreciation 
through interventions in the foreign exchange market could hardly be successful due to 
insufficient BNB foreign currency reserves.  The BNB intervened through relatively small 
amounts of sales that could not influence the exchange rate, as the demand for dollars was 
growing and strongly exceeding supply.  At the same time the BNB interventions 
contributed to the depletion of BNB foreign currency reserves and this carefully watched 
indicator began influencing the exchange rate depreciation to a greater extent than the 
BNB sales did (Chart 7).  The related deteriorating confidence in lev resulted in a further 
decline in demand for the domestic currency, stronger withdrawal of deposits from banks 
and increased demand for dollars.  These processes intensified in late 1996 and especially 
in early 1997 when the BNB foreign exchange reserves fell to about one month of 
imports and forced the BNB to minimize its interventions in the foreign exchange market 
(Chart 7).  
 
Interest rates in Bulgaria were largely dependent on the behavior of the base interest rate, 
which was administratively set by the BNB Management Board (Chart 8).  The base 
interest rate was used as a reference rate for lending rates, coupon rates for government 
securities and the remuneration of reserve holdings in at the BNB. Other rates, 
determined in the primary T-bills auctions and the BNB reverse repo auctions moved in 
line with the base interest rate. There were two main periods in the BNB interest rate 
policy. The first one was characterized by a cautious increase in the base interest rate and 
prevailed until September 23, 1996. The second period was introduced by the September 
package of measures when the base interest rate was drastically raised to 25 percent and 
then slightly lowered in October and November (Box 2.).  
 
 Box 2. The BNB Package of Measures of September 23, 1996 
 
Following the Contingency Plan and IMF recommendations, in September 1996 the BNB Board placed 9 banks 
into conservatorship and adopted a package of measures that focused on supporting all viable banks. The BNB
package of measures relied heavily on rapid privatization of SOEs. There were still some hopes that the second 
IMF tranche would be disbursed.  The IMF financing together with rapid privatization were expected to provide
the foreign exchange support that was the major precondition for the success of the BNB package.  The BNB 
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The BNB raised the base interest rate several times during the crisis. In May 1996 it was 
raised from 67 percent to 108 percent (simple annual, or 180 percent annual compound).  
Following the base interest rate, deposit rate on lev deposits reached about 100 percent.  
However, inflation increased by 20 percent in July and by another 15 percent in August 
and the real deposit rates became negative.  Nevertheless, the BNB was cautious about 
further increases in the base interest rate.  One reason why the BNB Management Board 
was reluctant to raise the base interest rate drastically was its link to the coupon payments 
on government securities.   Any increase in the base interest rate would result in an 
increase in the servicing costs of domestic debt and fiscal expenditures at a time when 
revenues were declining. 
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In September 1996 the IMF made again its standard recommendation to raise the base 
interest rate to allow for positive real deposit rates in order to avoid interest rate 
distortions that would further destabilize expectations and increase flight out of the 
national currency.   In fact a recommendation like that ignored the fiscal implications. 
The September increase in the base interest rate to 25 percent (300 percent simple annual) 
could neither reverse the withdrawal of deposits nor impact positively confidence in lev, 
but only further aggravated fiscal imbalances and problems of weaker banks.  It brought 
about a substantial increase in fiscal interest expenditures and created problems in 
servicing interest payments on loans and securities.  In January 1997 the option of an 
effective default on domestic debt was discussed by some government members, and was 
declined by the BNB in an attempt to avoid the complete collapse of the banking system 
in a period of lack of any political power and mass demonstrations. 
 
 
4. Introduction of the Currency Board 
 
The failure of the IMF money-based stabilization program stimulated discussions about 
fixing the exchange rate within a currency board.  The IMF believed that the new 
stabilization effort could be successful in bringing back confidence to the lev and banks 
only if it was based on simple rules imposing discipline, a fixed exchange rate, sufficient 
foreign exchange reserves promised to be provided by the IMF and bank privatization.  
The fixed exchange rate regime was considered appropriate for a small open economy 
like Bulgaria’s despite insufficient degree of price and capital account liberalization.  The 
IMF suggested to fix the exchange rate within the framework of a currency board 
arrangement (CBA), because it was believed to be the only cure for the Bulgarian 
inflation and lack of financial discipline.   
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The Bulgarian CBA had to face the challenges of external and fiscal imbalances  (Table 
4), strong seasonality of the fiscal revenues and structural problems stemming from the 
fragile banking system and loss-making enterprise sector. The CBA structure and 
mechanism of operation were designed to meet the challenges of the fragile banking 
sector and fiscal imbalances.  The IMF signaled it would provide the foreign exchange 
reserves needed for the smooth CBA operation. In fact, its introduction was the condition 
under which the IMF would continue providing financial support to Bulgaria.  
 
In addition, the CBA introduction was accompanied by a comprehensive program of 
banking sector rapid privatization by strategic foreign investors. Following it since the 
CBA introduction, considerable progress has been achieved in bank privatization and 
restructuring.  At present more than, 80% of the commercial banks’ assets are in private 
hands and over 73% are foreign-owned.   
 
4.1. Legislative Changes 
 
The option of introducing a CBA in Bulgaria was publicly introduced in November 1996 
by an IMF mission.  The discussions that took place within the BNB Management Board   
prior to the IMF mission arrival resulted in a decision that the CBA should be adopted by 
a new Law on the BNB.  The BNB Board rejected some early attempts to introduce the 
currency board without the necessary legislative changes and parliamentary approval.  
A transition period, during which certain preconditions had to be met in order to make the 
CBA introduction successful, was considered mandatory.    
 
The Implementation of the CBA was made possible on the basis of a new BNB Law, 
which was passed in June 1997 and effectively established the CBA on July 1, 1997.  The 
law introduced the CBA rules, restructured the BNB and pegged the lev to the German 
mark.  It strengthened the BNB independence of the Government and made the BSD 
more independent within the BNB. A new Law on Banks was also introduced in mid-
1997 that aimed at raising the effectiveness of banking supervision.  Based on the two 
new laws the BNB was empowered to revoke the license of any bank deemed insolvent. 
The Law on Banks introduced a very tight regime of large exposures with limited 
exceptions, and strengthened the BNB capacity to control the issuance of new licenses.  It 
also reduced the rights to appeal the BNB Board decisions and made mandatory a ten-fold 
increase in the minimum capital requirement. 
 
Several new prudential regulations were introduced in compliance with the requirements 
of the two new laws: a regulation on capital adequacy, a regulation on loan classification 
and provisioning, regulations on liquidity management and open foreign exchange 
positions.  The capital adequacy regulation established a risk-based measure of required 
minimum capital and the ratio was set at 8 percent for 1997, 10 percent for end-1998 and 
12 percent for end-1999.  The regulation on provisioning replaced the system, which 
made provisioning dependent on banks’ profits, as shown in the profit and loss statement, 
and led to under-provisioning.  The new regulation gave the BNB the right to require 
changes to classifications and provisioning when it disagreed with bank’s internal 
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classification.  The regulation also introduced mark- to- market pricing for securities 
holdings.   The BNB is continuously improving its prudential standards and updates the 
regulations accordingly.  
 
A new Deposit Insurance Law was also introduced.  It became effective on January 
1,1999, when the introduction of a new Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) became possible.  
To reduce the potential fiscal cost of bank failures, the new law introduced a less 
generous deposit insurance scheme.  The DIF is an independent legal entity and it is 
funded from initial fees paid by banks, annual premia contributed by banks, investment 
income, and the fund’s share of closed banks’ assets in case of subrogation. 
 
4.2. Introduction of the CBA 
 
Since early 1997 the BNB began to prepare for the CBA introduction by gradually 
downsizing its open market operations and refinancing facility. In April 1997, the interim 
government began implementing a macroeconomic stabilization program that was 
centered on the CBA introduction.  As the political turmoil gradually subsided and 
external financing was restored under a new V SBA and a CCFF, signs of confidence 
revival began to emerge months before the CBA introduction (Chart 5).  The lev 
stabilized as confidence in the lev returned. One important requirement for the setting up 
of the CBA was to have sufficient amount of foreign exchange reserves to fully cover the 
monetary base. The restored external financing by external creditors began providing 
foreign exchange reserves to the BNB.  In addition, the crisis resulted in a substantial 
decline in real money demand to 20 percent of the level that prevailed before the crisis.   
 
The new BNB Law made the CBA introduction possible in mid-1997. The main principle 
of the CBA requires that the Issue Departmnet issues and redeems monetary liabilties (at 
the official exchange rate) for the reserve currency on demand and without any 
limitations.  The deutschemark was preferred to the dollar9 as the peg currency in view of 
prospects for Bulgaria’s future EU accession. The exchange rate was fixed on the basis of 
the prevailing market BGL/DM exchange rate a couple of months after the emergence of 
hyperinflationary rates and few weeks prior to the CBA introduction.  The new Law on 
the BNB pegged the BGL to the DM, at an official exchange rate of BGL 1, 000* per DM 
1 and obliged the BNB and its branches to sell and purchase on demand deutchemarks 
against levs without any limitations within the territory of Bulgaria.  Once the euro came 
into existence, the BNB re-pegged the lev from the deutschemark to the euro, pursuant to 
article 29 of the BNB Law.  
 
The challenges of the Bulgarian environment imposed a specific structure of the CBA 
that compromises between the structure of an orthodox currency board and a full-fledged 
                                                 
9 In 1997 the US$ had the highest share in the currency structure of Bulgarian foreign trade (about 70 
percent), while the DM share was about 25 percent but it has grown since then to about 40 percent.  Foreign 
trade with the European Union is growing continuously.  At the time of the CBA introduction the share of 
dollar-denominated external debt was about 62 percent and is about the same at present.  
* Since mid-1999 BGL 1 000 = BGN 1 = DM 1 
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central bank. The BNB was divided into an Issue Department and a Banking Department. 
Correspondingly, the BNB balance sheet was also divided into two balance sheets. The 
Banking Department deposit with the Issue Department establishes the relationship 
between the two departments.  The Issue Department holds the BNB monetary liabilities: 
banknotes and coins, banks’ deposits, other non-government deposits, government 
deposits, part of which comprise the Fiscal Reserve Account, and the deposit of Banking 
Department (Table 9).  All Issue Department liabilities are covered by foreign exchange 
reserves and gold. To enhance the CBA credibility and transparency the Issue Department 
combines the foreign exchange reserves of both the BNB and government.  
 
Table 9. Balance Sheet of the Bulgarian National Bank, Issue Department/CBA 
Assets Liabilities 
Cash and nostro accounts in foreign currency Currency in circulation 
Monetary gold Bank deposits and current accounts 
Foreign securities Government deposits and accounts 
Accrued interest receivable Other depositors’ accounts  
 Account of State Fund for Reconstruction and 
Development  
 Accrued interest payable 
 Banking Department deposit 
Source: BNB 
 
The Banking Department deposit with Issue Department was meant  to meet the 
challenges of the fragile banking sector, which was still trying to recover from the crisis, 
and required a lender of last resort (LOLR).  Some foreign exchnage reserves in excess of 
what is needed to cover the monetary base provide a limited LOLR facility in case of 
liquidity risks, affecting the stability of the banking system10.  These funds are subject to 
negotiations with the IMF and are kept as a deposit of Banking Department with Issue 
Department. The IMF program sets floors for the deposit of Banking Department with 
Issue Department. Bank refinancing is limited by the amount of this deposit, and in 
addition, being one of the performance criteria of the IMF-supported program, 
consultations with the IMF are required when a loan above BGN 2 million is to be 
extended to a bank.  The Banking Department also holds other assets and claims on the 
Central Bank and acts as a fiscal agent of Bulgaria with the IMF.  This implies that the 
SDR purchases from the IMF are channeled through Banking Department from where 
                                                 
10 Regulation 6 of the BNB defines “liquidity risk for the banking system” and establishes the terms of 
extending collateralized lev loans to banks in cases of liquidity risks affecting the stability of the banking 
system.  The total amount of the highly liquid assets pledged as a collateral should cover at least 125 
percent of the loan amount approved by the BNB.  The loan should be repaid within three months.  The 
refinancing rate is “higher than the average interest rate in the inter-bank market”.  
* BGN = BGL 1 000 since mid-1999. 
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they can be either lent to the government or kept as a Banking Department deposit with 
Issue Department.   
 
Issue Department holds also government deposits, which comprise the Fiscal Reserve 
Account and are fully covered with foreign exchange reserves. The Fiscal Reserve 
Account (FRA) was formed to help avoid any short-term financing requirements of the 
budget, resulting from any seasonal fluctuations of the fiscal balance.  Each IMF program 
determines the balance of the FRA in order to make sure that the budget will not face any 
unexpected difficulties.  The floors on the FRA provide the reserve funds the government 
needs in order to ensure its debt service and the stable position of the fiscal balance.   
 
To meet the debt service and fiscal balance challenges, the BNB was given the 
opportunity to lend IMF purchases to the government upon a decision of the BNB 
Management Board11.  Based on the IMF program, strict and transparent rules were 
introduced that provided for the use of IMF funds to stabilize the fiscal balance.  
Receiving and on-lending of IMF funds to the government is conditional upon meeting 
the IMF Program performance criteria and the decision of the BNB Management Board to 
extend credit to the government under art. 45 of the BNB Law12.  
 
Conducting monetary policy is impossible under a typical CBA.  The specific structure of 
the Bulgarian CBA allows conducting some limited monetary policy. In addition to 
extending credit to commercial banks and the government under specific tight conditions, 
the BNB can also change the minimum required reserves, held at Issue Department. 
Initially, the minimum required reserves were fixed by the BNB Regulation 21 at 11 
percent of deposits included in M3. In mid-2000 they were reduced to 8 percent.  The 
conditions for access to the minimum required reserves were eased by the new version of 
BNB Regulation 21 in early April 1998, which introduced daily averaging.  
 
To improve banking supervision, the BSD was reorganized, expanded, and trained its 
staff with the assistance of foreign advisors.  To implement the Strategic Plan for on-site 
supervision, the BSD trained on-site examiners and developed an Examination Manual. 
Off-site supervision made significant progress by developing new monthly and quarterly 
call reports from banks, and requested from them the submission of these reports. To 
enhance the credibility and effectiveness of the new banking laws and regulations, the 
                                                 
11 Article 45 of the BNB Law states that the BNB may not extend credits in any form whatsoever to the 
state or to any state agency, except credits against purchases of SDRs from the IMF, extended by the BNB 
Management Board. 
12 The provision of the BNB Law regarding on-lending of IMF purchases to the government was introduced 
in order to help avoid violations of the BNB independence whenever budget deficit financing was required 
and could not be provided from alternative sources. Prior to the CBA introduction there were incidences 
when the limits on the BNB direct credit to the government, set by the previous BNB Law (1991), were 
overruled on the basis of Para 2 of the Additional Provisions of the Organic Budget Law. To diminish the 
opportunity of overruling the BNB Law, article 45 was introduced, allowing on-lending of IMF purchases 
to the government. However, the BNB independence can be guaranteed only by an amendment to the 
Constitution of Bulgaria, which will eliminate any provisions that can overrule the BNB Law (Roussenova, 
2000).  
 28 
BNB BSD introduced requirements for bank accounting, auditing, and reporting 
consistent with international practices. 
 
The rules and discipline imposed by the CBA, the new tight prudential regulation 
together with improved banking supervision resulted in the implementation of 
conservative lending policies by banks. Bulgarian commercial banks are sound, highly 
liquid and well capitalized. The average CAR was 31 percent in end-December 2001, 
with Group IV  (the group of the smallest banks) having the highest CAR of 47 percent, 
followed by the biggest bank Group I (36 percent). The non-performing loan exposure 
ratio (watch, substandard, doubtful and loss) keeps declining and reached 7 percent in the 
end of 2001. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The Bulgarian crisis experience indicates that the dual crisis requires system-wide policy 
measures addressing both the baking sector crisis and the currency crisis. Fragmentary 
policy measures may have only temporary success and will finally lead to new waves of 
crisis, which might be even deeper and more devastating. The Bulgarian banking crisis 
required radical system-wide measures like: 
 
• closure of bankrupt banks, 
• privatization of viable banks mainly through sale to strategic investors, 
• introduction of  adequate prudential regulations, 
• efficient banking supervision and 
• privatization of the corporate sector. 
 
Banking sector reform and monetary tightening could not be successful and sustainable if 
not supported by real sector reforms. 
 
Radical policy measures addressing the banking sector crisis could be successful if 
supported by radical approaches to monetary management. Money-based programs are 
unsustainable in a period of baking and currency crisis. The successful banking crisis 
resolution required radical policy measures to resolve the currency crisis and achieve 
economic stabilization. Overcoming a currency crisis of the magnitude Bulgaria 
experienced required: 
 
• substantial foreign currency support to raise the central bank international reserves 
to levels that can stabilize the national currency, 
• introduction of a tight monetary policy; in the case of Bulgaria the introduction of 
the CBA was possible and appropriate as it introduced strict rules and discipline 
and restored  confidence in the lev; 
• central bank independence guaranteed by law. 
 
In Bulgaria all these requirements were met with the CBA introduction. It was designed 
to meet the specific challenges of the Bulgarian economy and the banking sector in 
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particular. Its success could be attributed to its specific structure and principles of 
operation, as well as to the IMF support. 
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